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Introduction.
Earnings stripping is a tactic multinational firms use to shift taxable income from a high-tax country to a low-tax country by financing a subsidiary located in a high-tax country with loans from the parent (internal debt) through a subsidiary located in a low-tax country. Since interest payments on debt are generally tax deductible, the use of internal debt allows multinationals to reduce its overall corporate income tax payments.
In 2014, earnings stripping was at the heart of the contentious debate about corporate inversions. By moving the parent corporation of a multinational from the United States to a country with a lower tax rate (pretty much the rest of the world), the new parent corporation could load up its U.S. subsidiaries with internal debt in order to strip pre-tax income out of the United States. This concern prompted legislators such as Senator Charles Schumer to propose legislation specifically intended to curb earnings stripping activity.
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Earnings stripping is also central to the on-going criticisms by a number of OECD countries of the U.S. "Check-The-Box" (CTB) legislation. CTB was passed in 1997 to simplify the process by which a U.S. firm could elect its tax status as a corporation or a partnership. For U.S. multinationals, CTB enables the parent company to structure an affiliate in a host country so that it is treated as a corporation/subsidiary by the host country and as a branch by the United States.
The effect of CTB is that the U.S. parent can use internal debt to strip taxable income out of a host country without generating an offsetting tax liability in the United States (as subpart F income). Blouin and Krull (2015) provide a more detailed description of the tax implications of CTB.
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The amount of interest that a subsidiary of a multinational can deduct from its host country taxable income is determined by the rate of interest applied to its debt and the amount of its debt. Host countries can limit tax-induced income shifting via manipulation of the interest rate on internal debt (a transfer price) by auditing to make sure that the interest rate is in line with what a third-party lender would charge for a comparable risk (i.e., the arm's-length standard). Host countries can also limit the use of income shifting via the amount of debt financing by adopting thin-capitalization rules.
Most countries do not have thin-capitalization rules to inhibit the amount of internal debt financing. Instead, they tend to rely on the arm's-length principle to determine what an independent lender would have been willing to lend to the firm. Among countries that have thin-capitalization rules, most use a type of rule called a safe harbor rule. A safe harbor rule limits the tax deductibility of interest payments if the debt-equity ratio of the subsidiary is too large. The use of earnings stripping rules has emerged in recent years because of the perception that safe harbor rules are ineffective. A few countries use both types of rules, whereby a subsidiary must satisfy either both rules or only one of the rules. Table 1 reports the variation in thin-capitalization rules among 160 countries in 2013. See Blouin et al. (2014) and Table 1 . 5 EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 6 The data comes primarily from Ernst and Young (2013) . Although the number of countries using an earnings stripping rule, alone or in conjunction with a safe harbor rule is small, they include significant economics. The countries using only an earnings stripping rule in 2013 are Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark and Japan impose both a safe harbor rule and an earnings stripping rule. Bulgaria, France, Guam, Northern Marinana Islands, the United States, and the U.S. Virgin Islands impose an earnings stripping rule and a safe harbor rule but require that only one be satisfied. For France, a company need only satisfy one of the rules. For Bulgaria, the United States, and its affiliated territories, the earnings stripping rule is marginal in that it is effective only if the safe harbor limit is exceeded. Hong Kong, Sweden, and the United Kingdom do not have thin-capitalization rules but use other special rules to limit debt financing.
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium framework with both labor and capital that allows us to analyze the implications of the various thincapitalization rules observed in practice. The model allows us to understand how a country's choice of a thin-capitalization rule influences not just the incidence of internal debt financing but also the transfer pricing behavior of multinationals. In our setting, a host country chooses a thin-capitalization rule to limit income 7
Finland and Norway adopted earnings stripping rules in 2014.
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shifting by excessive interest deductions. A multinational firm has a financing subsidiary located in a tax haven and can invest in an operational subsidiary in the host country (high-tax country). The operational affiliate can shift pre-tax income to the tax-haven affiliate by the level of internal debt borrowed from the haven affiliate and the interest rate (transfer price) it pays on this internal debt.
We show the policy, among all the combinations observed in practice, which maximizes the host country's national income is an earnings stripping rule without a safe harbor rule. The reason for our result is as follows. The multinational firm can shift profit either by the abusive interest rate (transfer price) or by internal debt. The latter allows the firm to avoid the tax on the normal rate of return on mobile capital directly, whereas an abusive transfer price is an indirect and more costly way of mitigating the tax wedge both for the firm and
society. An earnings stripping rule is more effective at curbing abusive transfer pricing and is therefore a better choice from a host country's perspective.
Related literature.
It is well known that multinational companies shift income by debt and transfer prices from affiliates in low-tax countries to affiliates in high-tax countries. In general, the income-shifting tactics of multinationals can have two effects. The first effect is base erosion. The significance of this effect is evidenced by the BEPS project initiated by the OECD in 2013 (OECD, 2013) .
The second effect of profit shifting is increased foreign direct investment (FDI) from a higher after-tax return to investment.
There is a small but emerging literature that discusses the welfare effects of tax havens when multinationals use tax-haven conduit companies to shift income. Hines (2010) but add "parasitic" tax havens to the model in the sense that tax havens are "parasitic" on the tax revenues of non-haven countries. In their model tax havens sell concealment services to taxpayers in non-havens, and non-haven countries must expend real resources to prevent tax base erosion. They show that tax havens increase the social costs that a country incurs when it increases its tax on capital. This aggravates the tax competition problem and results in lower welfare.
There is also a positive literature on the tax sensitivity of debt and the effect of thin-capitalization rules on a firm's financial structure. Huizinga et al. (2008) model the optimal allocation of external debt and find that ignoring international debt shifting as part of the firm's leverage decision understates the impact of national taxes on debt policies by about 25%. Egger et al. (2010) 7 analyze debt shifting by internal debt and find that multinationals have a significantly higher debt-to-asset ratio than national firms, and that this difference is larger in high-tax countries. Møen et al. (2015) show that it is optimal for a multinational firm to shift profit by using both internal debt and external debt. A main result from their empirical analysis is that the shifting of internal and external debt is of about equal importance in German multinationals. See also Desai (2004) for U.S. multinationals and Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) for an overview. The empirical literature on taxation and capital structure, as reviewed in Auerbach (2002) and Graham (2003) , find small effects of tax incentives on capital structure. This is attributed to a lack of variation in tax rates. More recent studies where data encompass the bulk of tax reforms in OECD countries find larger effects. 8 to set more permissive safe harbor rules because they face a more elastic tax base.
More closely related to our paper is Mardan (2015) who investigates earnings stripping rules and rules in a setting with two countries and capital as the only input. His focus is on how credit market constraints may affect leverage and thincapitalization rules. He finds no clear cut preference for safe harbor or earnings stripping rules.
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To our knowledge we are the first to show in a general equilibrium framework with both capital and labor as input choices, with firms engaging in both transfer pricing and debt shifting, and that allows for hybrid as well as traditional rules, that an earnings stripping rules maximizes a host country's national income.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model in which multinational firms can shift profit with debt financing and transfer prices. To allow for the hybrid policies observed in Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Japan, and the United States, a host country will choose a thin-capitalization policy that consists of both a safe harbor limit and an earnings stripping limit.
Section 3 derives the optimal firm responses to all possible host country's thin capitalization policies. Section 4 then describes which limits will be binding in any FDI and labor-market equilibrium. The host country's optimal thin capitalization policy is then derived in section 5. Several extensions of the base model are discussed in section 6 and concluding remarks are offered in section 7.
A model of profit-shifting via debt and transfer prices.
We adapt the model in GSS to allow for a host country to distinguish 10 Kalamov (2015) studies the equilibrium choice of safe harbor and earnings stripping rules with two host countries but in a model in which the multinational cannot shift income into a tax haven with transfer pricing. 9 between the effects of a safe harbor rule and an earnings stripping rule. A multinational firm can invest capital, either equity or debt, in a single host country. All of the FDI is issued by a subsidiary of the multinational located in a tax-haven country that levies a zero tax rate on corporate income.
The host country economy consists of workers, who inelastically supply one unit of labor, and entrepreneurs, who own domestic firms. 
The host country levies a profit tax rate of t so that domestic firms have a post-tax profit of (1 -t)π.
The multinational firm operates with the production function, ( , )
where L m denotes the amount of host-country labor it employs and K denotes the amount of capital invested in its host country subsidiary. ( , ) F   is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and homogeneous of degree 1 in both inputs. The multinational faces the same competitive wage rate, w, and sells its output in a competitive market whose price is also normalized to one. Denote the multinational's economic cost of capital by r.
The multinational can choose to finance its capital investment with equity, E, and/or internal debt, B, so that K E B   . In order to focus on the incomeshifting strategies of the multinational firm we focus on the use of internal debt only. By definition, income shifting is done between related parties and the vast majority of thin-capitalization rules in place targets intra-firm transactions and 10 internal debt only.
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We assume that the multinational's economic cost of capital reflects, in part, a country-specific risk of the investment so that r need not simply equal a worldwide interest rate. The idiosyncratic cost of capital allows the multinational to charge its host country subsidiary an interest rate, , that can differ from r.
That is, is the transfer price of internal debt. Allowing the multinational to use its transfer price on debt to shift income out of the host country is the simplest and most direct way to see the linkages between debt-shifting and transfer pricing, and it is consistent with the fact that many countries use arm's-length price auditing standards to the interest rates multinationals charge for internal debt.
The multinational incurs transfer pricing costs of ( ) c r B
 
to reflect any transfer price auditing the host country may conduct. These transfer pricing costs consist of two components. First, the cost function, ( ) c  , is increasing and convex in the difference between and r, which we take to be the arm's-length interest rate.
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Second, the multinational's transfer pricing costs are proportional to the amount of debt as the total amount of shifted profit will equal ( ) r B   . A key reason for financing a subsidiary with debt instead of equity is that payments on debt are tax deductible expenses while dividend payments to equity holders are not.
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In terms of the trade-offs between issuing external debt and 11
The main exceptions are Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Portugal. Norway and Finland, which recently introduced earnings stripping rules, do not restrict external debt. internal debt, previous studies such as Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) and Chowdhry and Coval (1998) argue that internal debt is really tax-favored equity. However, Chowdry and Nanda (1994) show that internal debt can be issued with the same seniority as external debt. As a result internal debt can create agency costs associated with an increased probability of bankruptcy. Internal debt also generates costs of complying with thin capitalization rules and adjusting managerial incentive contracts. Consistent with Egger et al. (2010) , Mintz and Smart (2004) , Schindler and Schjelderup (2012) and Mardan (2015) , we assume the multinational incurs debt-financing costs of D(B/K) that are strictly increasing and strictly convex in the subsidiary's debt to equity ratio for B > 0. We also
As long as the subsidiary faces the same tax rate on host country profit as do domestic firms, the multinational's after-tax profit is defined as
Notice that the subsidiary's interest expense, B  , is tax deductible in the host country. According to (2.2), the multinational can avoid any transfer price costs by setting r   even if B > 0 while it can avoid the debt issuance costs only by setting B = 0. The tax savings from internal debt net of transfer price costs equals
, which implies that the unconstrained optimal transfer price satisfies c t   . By the convexity of ( ) c  , t c
for B = 0 and c t   . Thus, in the absence of any thin-capitalization rules, a multinational that chooses to invest in the host country has an incentive to use some debt financing.
If the host country adopts a safe harbor rule, then the host subsidiary will be able to deduct its interest expense against its host country income only if With b e  (1 t) and sufficiently costly transfer price regulation, will be small enough so that (2.4) is slack.
The host country seeks to maximize its national income, Y, which is the sum of worker and entrepreneur consumption. Aggregate worker consumption equals wage income, w, plus taxes, T. Since a profit-maximizing multinational 13 will employ labor so that L F w  , regardless of the thin-capitalization rule the host country adopts, host tax revenues equal
Entrepreneur income equals (1 ) t   . Thus, host country national income is equal
We do not include a welfare term that weights entrepreneur profit differently from worker income or tax revenues nor do we include a fraction of multinational profit associated with some host country ownership as these extra terms would not change our main result.
Optimal Firm Behavior.
Allowing for the possibility that a host country imposes safe harbor and earnings stripping rules on the multinational, the firm's profit-maximization problem becomes , , ,
To solve the multinational's profit-maximization problem, define the Lagrangean to be
where  and are the Lagrange multipliers. The necessary first-order conditions associated with (3.2) are (a) 14 Although Π is not globally concave, due to the non-convexity of ( ) D  with respect to B and K, the constraint qualifications are satisfied at all points at which one or both of the constraints binds, except if B = 0. Since zero internal debt was ruled out as a solution in section 2, (3.3) and the associated complementary slackness conditions will define a solution to (3.1). Recall from Table 1 that the United States uses an earnings stripping rule which applies only if the safe harbor rule is violated while France allows a firm to satisfy either its safe harbor rule or its earnings stripping rule. Since the earnings stripping constraint is negatively sloped (as illustrated in Figure 1 ) either type of hybrid policy is weaker than a policy of simply requiring that both constraints be satisfied. With a U.S. or French-type policy, the maximum debt level for which the interest payments would be tax deductible at each transfer price is the larger of the amounts allowed individually by each of the two rules. But this means the optimal transfer price and debt level will be the same as if no earnings stripping rule was in force unless the earnings stripping limit permits higher debt levels than the safe harbor rule for all possible transfer prices. In this case such hybrid policies are identical to imposing only an earnings stripping rule.
Proposition 2. A U.S. or French hybrid policy is equivalent to a policy that uses only a safe harbor rule unless the earnings stripping limit permits higher internal debt levels for all transfer prices. In this latter case, the hybrid policy is identical to one that uses only an earnings stripping rule.
In order for a policy that uses both rules to generate different multinational behavior than a single rule would, the policy must require that both rules be satisfied (in which case the smaller limit on internal debt defines the maximum amount of debt that is permissible for each transfer price). This is the policy Denmark and Japan use. (as we will show it does) then the safe harbor constraint is indirectly relaxed, and this would imply a lower transfer price. Thus, the general equilibrium implications of safe harbor and earnings stripping rules can differ from their partial equilibrium properties. To capture these effects, we need to characterize equilibrium behavior.
Host Country Equilibria.
A host country equilibrium consists of profit-maximizing multinational choices, defined by (3.3) and the associated complementary slackness conditions, profit-maximizing employment by domestic firms, defined by 
Safe Harbor Only.
Suppose Intuitively, the existence of this upper bound occurs because an increase in b s causes the multinational to employ more capital (and labor) and the net effect is to decrease the equilibrium return to capital. As the equilibrium return to capital falls, the right-hand side of (4.3) gets smaller so any slack in the earnings stripping constraint is reduced.
The boundary of this safe-harbor equilibrium region is defined by * *
(1 ) ( on the debt to equity ratio in this case), then K will be increasing in b e .
Safe Harbor and Earnings Stripping.
Finally, suppose that b s and b e are set so that both constraints bind in equilibrium. Combining the results from Propositions 3 and 4 gives us the conditions under which an equilibrium can exist with both constraints binding. 
Proposition 5. An equilibrium exists in which both the safe harbor and earnings stripping constraint bind only if
* * / ( (1 ) ( )) / ((1 )
Host Country Welfare.
We restrict attention to national income maximization. It is affected by FDI in three ways: tax revenues from the FDI, increased wages, and lower profits for domestic entrepreneurs. Given the definition of national income, Y, in (2.6), a safe harbor rule implies that
while an earnings stripping rule or a combined safe harbor/earnings stripping rule implies that 
As shown in the appendix, the constant returns to scale properties of F combined with the labor market conditions,
where the coefficient on dK is strictly positive because
equilibrium for which the earnings stripping constraint is slack. If K is sufficiently large at b s = 0, the national income maximizing safe harbor limit can be zero.
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Totally differentiating Y ES and using the labor market conditions again implies that
The coefficient on dK is unambiguously positive. Also, notice that ( GSS show that the optimal host country safe harbor rule may support no FDI in equilibrium. In such a case, the minimum value of b s above which FDI is strictly positive will itself be strictly positive.
implies that it is never optimal for the host country to set its safe harbor limit so low that this case arises in equilibrium. Relaxing the safe harbor rule will increase FDI and thus wages and production without any loss in tax revenue since the earnings stripping rule is still binding. The dashed lines represent portions of iso-welfare curves. In the safe-harbor-only region, the iso-welfare curves are vertical since decreases in b e within this region have no effect on national income.
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If the optimal single-rule policy induces zero FDI in equilibrium, there will be a range of limit values that are optimal. In this case, 
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Similarly, in the earnings-stripping-only region, the iso-welfare curves are horizontal since increases in b s within this region have no effect on national income.
These properties of the iso-welfare curves and Proposition 6 lead to the main result of our paper. The reason for this result is that internal debt (i.e., debt shifting) allows the firm to avoid the tax on the normal rate of return on mobile capital directly, whereas an abusive transfer price is an indirect and more costly way of mitigating the tax wedge both for the firm and society. An earnings stripping rule is more effective at curbing abusive transfer pricing and is therefore a better choice from the host country's perspective.
Extensions.
We now weaken several of the model's assumptions to demonstrate the robustness of Theorem 1.
Generalized Welfare Function.
The national income welfare function weights domestic firm after-tax profits the same as worker income. More generally, one could define host country welfare under binding safe harbor and earnings stripping rules as
where [0, 1]   is the welfare weight on the after-tax income of the domestic entrepreneurs. Now the modified version of (5.5) implies that
As the coefficient on dK/db s is strictly positive for all β, lowering the welfare weight on domestic entrepreneur income does not alter Theorem 1. 
The multinational production function and debt-financing costs.
In this subsection, we relax the assumptions that the multinational's production function exhibits constant returns to scale and the debt-financing function depends only on the firm's debt-equity ratio. We now assume that In this paper, we characterize the set of equilibria for all possible combinations of safe harbor and earnings stripping rules in a general-equilibrium model with both capital and labor choices. Our model allows multinationals to shift income via internal debt financing and transfer pricing. We show that the optimal policy that maximizes the host country's national income is a pure earnings stripping rule without a safe harbor rule.
Our finding follows from the insight that internal debt allows the firm to avoid the tax on the normal rate of return on mobile capital directly, whereas an abusive transfer price is an indirect and more costly way of mitigating the tax 29 wedge both for the firm and society. If there are decreasing returns to scale, transfer pricing also lets the multinational shift economic profit, which is not desirable from an optimal tax policy point of view. An earnings stripping rule is more effective at curbing abusive transfer pricing and is therefore a better choice from a host country's perspective. .13) 
